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JURISDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(k). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether plaintiff came forward with competent 
evidence showing a triable issue of fact that asphalt sealant 
was making the parking lot slippery at the time plaintiff fell. 
2. Whether given the undisputed facts of this case, 
the trial court correctly concluded that defendant neither knew 
nor should have known that asphalt sealant was making the 
parking lot slippery. 
In determining whether there were genuine issues of 
fact, the Court does not defer to the trial court's ruling; it 
reviews the facts and inferences drawn therefrom in the light 
most favorable to the losing party. Hamblin v. City of 
Clearfield, 795 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah 1990); Canfield v. 
Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224, 1226 (Utah App. 1992). When 
there are no disputed issues of material fact, a challenge to 
summary judgment presents only questions of law that are 
reviewed for correctness. West v. Thomson Newspapers, 872 P.2d 
999, 1004 (Utah 1994) . In determining whether the trial court 
drew the right conclusion from undisputed facts, the Court 
looks at whether "only one conclusion" can be drawn from the 
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undisputed facts. Silcox v. Skaacrs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P. 2d 
623, 624 (Utah App. 1991). 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
Plaintiff slipped and fell while walking in the rain 
at Little America. (R.2) Originally, plaintiff contended that 
she slipped on oil or automotive grease in the parking lot. 
(R.24 8) When we informed her that eight months prior to the 
accident the asphalt had been treated with a sealant, she 
changed her theory and said there was no oil or grease; it was 
the sealant that made the asphalt unreasonably slippery. 
(RR.224-25) 
We waited for plaintiff to finish her discovery1 and 
moved for summary judgment. (R.61) We moved for summary 
judgment because (1) there was no evidence that the sealant was 
making the asphalt slippery when wet and (2) there was no 
evidence that Little America knew or should have known that the 
sealant was making the asphalt slippery when wet. (RR.83-88) 
In support of the motion, we adduced a number of facts (RR.78-
83) that are set forth in the following Statement of Facts of 
this brief. 
Plaintiff attempted to put those facts at issue with 
an affidavit from Charles Turnbow. (R.142) Mr. Turnbow is an 
xTwo sets of requests for admission, four sets of requests 




attorney and professional engineer. (R.148) He claimed to be 
an expert in "slip and fall cases." (R.143) He did not visit 
Little America or conduct any tests of its asphalt or the 
sealant that was used on its asphalt. After reviewing the 
pleadings and depositions in this case (RR.143-45), he rendered 
the following opinion: "For a period of time following the 
application of asphalt sealant of the general kind applied by 
defendant in or about August 1990, the surface to which the 
sealant is applied will be 'slippery when wet.'" (R.145) 
We complained about a number of deficiencies in Mr. 
Turnbow's affidavit and made them the subject of a motion to 
strike. (RR.187, 198-99) First, there appeared to be no 
foundation for his conclusion -- Though Mr. Turnbow boasts a 
background in chemistry, he failed to identify any experience 
with asphalt sealant. Second, Mr. Turnbow failed to state any 
facts in support of his conclusion -- What is it about asphalt 
sealant that makes it "slippery when wet"? Third, the 
conclusion was irrelevant -- Mr. Turnbow failed to state that 
the sealant was making the asphalt slippery when wet eight 
months after its application. Fourth, Mr. Turnbow said nothing 
about the critical issue of how we were supposed to know, 
assuming it were true, that the sealant was making the asphalt 
slippery when wet eight months after its application. 
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The trial court did not formally rule on our motion 
to strike. However, the Minute Entry granting our motion for 
summary judgment said the following about Mr. Turnbow's 
affidavit: 
The fact that any asphalt is somewhat more 
slippery when wet than when dry is common 
knowledge....To that knowledge the 
affidavit of the plaintiff's expert Turnbow 
adds nothing. In addition the Court is of 
the opinion that many of Mr. Turnbow's 
opinions are based on information the 
source of which and the reliability of 
which is not revealed within his affidavit. 
(R.220)(emphasis added). 
In addition to the affidavit of Charles Turnbow, 
plaintiff attempted to create a factual issue with the 
testimony of a lawyer named Bruce Parker (who was accompanying 
plaintiff on her trip). (R.170) Mr. Parker claimed to have 
slipped in the rain (R.173), but he admitted making no report 
of the incident to Little America. (R.816, LL.19-20) Mr. 
Parker reported that another lawyer in the group slipped and 
fell in the rain. (R.173) This of course was hearsay, and we 
objected. (R.190) But we deemed it immaterial since Mr. Parker 
admitted there was no report of the incident to Little America. 
(R.819, LL.20-23) 
Plaintiff attempted to create a factual issue by 
testifying that two weeks after the incident, a Little America 
"employee" reported to her that slip and fall incidents 
161X47654 1 
- 4 -
happened "all the time" at Little America. (R.184) Plaintiff's 
testimony lacked foundation (and we objected) (R.192) because 
plaintiff never identified the employee (R.574, LL.22-25, 
R.575, LL.1-4).2 
Finally, plaintiff attempted to create a factual 
issue with the label from the sealant can. The label from the 
can read as follows: 
This is a protective coating for asphalt 
pavements.... It is recommended for 
driveways, parking lots, tennis courts, 
school playgrounds and other bituminous 
pavement surfaces. 
Driveway Coating may be applied at all 
temperatures above freezing. It must be 
rolled on the surface using a medium-to-
heavy nap roller. 
Roll coating on evenly, working into pores. 
Apply as thinly as possible, covering 
surface. On smooth pavement, fine silica 
sand may be broadcast into wet coating to 
increase non-slip characteristics. (R.136) 
The trial court granted our motion for summary 
judgment because plaintiff failed to adduce any competent 
evidence that Little America knew or should have known that the 
sealant was making the asphalt slippery at the time she fell. 
(R.221) On this appeal, we contend that the trial court should 
be affirmed for the additional reason that plaintiff never 
2We even tried to help her by identifying everyone who was 
on duty the day in question. (R.373) 
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adduced any competent evidence that the sealant was in fact 
making the asphalt slippery at the time she fell.3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
These are the facts we adduced in support of our 
summary judgment motion: 
1. Plaintiff, who was a guest at defendant's Little 
America Hotel, slipped and fell on wet asphalt while walking 
from the main lobby to one of the outside lodges. (R.2) 
2. It was raining at the time of the incident, 
though not as hard as earlier that day. (R.484, LL.19-23; 
R.489, LL.9-19) 
3. Plaintiff experienced no problem with slipping 
until at the precise location where she fell. (R.490, LL.7-14) 
4. More than eight months prior to the incident 
(August, 1990), defendant treated the asphalt at Little America 
with a gilsonite-based asphalt sealant. (R.862, LL.2-9; R.893, 
LL.9-11) 
5. Defendant had done this many times before, and 
the last time was in 1988. (R.866, LL.3-6; R.867, LL.12-15) 
3By her clever juxtaposition of the first full sentences 
on page 3 of her brief, plaintiff makes it seem that defendant 
has acknowledged the sealant was making the asphalt slippery at 
the time she fell. Defendant has acknowledged that as a matter 
of common knowledge asphalt surfaces are slippery when wet. 
Defendant denies (and plaintiff has yet to prove) that the 
sealant was making the asphalt slippery at the time she fell. 
161V47654 1 
- 6 -
6. There were no "problems" with the treatment in 
1988 (R.913, LL.25), and the treatment in 1990 was "virtually 
identical" to the one in 1988. (R.866, LL. 14-19) 
7. There were no reported incidents on the asphalt 
for the two years following the treatment in 1988 or for the 
eight months following the treatment in 1990.4 
8. On April 25, 1991, a woman named Sandra Walraven 
slipped and fell on the asphalt. (R.741, LL.15-25; R.749, 
LL.20-25, R.750, LL.1-2) 
9. It was "raining pretty hard" at the time. (R.745, 
LL.22-25) 
10. Ms. Walraven reported the incident to a Little 
America security officer who wrote it up in an Incident Report. 
(R.760, LL.11-25; R.985, LL.24-25, R.986, LL.4-16; R.1116) 
11. The Incident Report makes no mention of the 
asphalt being "slick" or "slippery," it simply reports that Ms. 
Walraven fell "while it was raining." (R.1116) 
12. Ms. Walraven remembers telling the security 
officer that "it was raining, the pavement was slick, and I 
fell." (R.762, LL.2-3) 
4In response to plaintiff's discovery (R.231), we produced 
"Incident Reports" for all slip and falls that had occurred on 
Little America asphalt since December 31, 1986. There were 
four such incidents (RR.233-36), and the first occurred on 
April 25, 1991 (R.236), more than eight months after the last 
application of asphalt sealant. 
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13. Ms. Walraven did not immediately report the 
incident; she went to the hotel restaurant for a cup of coffee. 
(R.786, LL.19-24) 
14. Ms. Walraven admitted that the only reason she 
reported the incident is because her foot started hurting while 
having coffee. (R.786, L.25, R.787, LL.1-4) 
15. Ms. Walraven admitted that she would not have 
reported the incident if her foot had not started hurting. 
(R.787, LL.7-13) 
16. The first complaint about "wet, very slick 
pavement" came in a letter from Ms. Walraven dated May 7, 1991. 
(R.774, LL.22-25, R.775, LL.1-13; Exhibit 4) This was days 
after plaintiff's incident. 
17. Before this lawsuit, none of the Little America 
personnel deposed by plaintiff5 considered there to be or 
heard there was a problem with the asphalt surfaces in the 
rain; slip and fall incidents were "so minimal and seldom" that 
5John Stoner, chief of security; Leendert Van Hulten, the 
security officer who investigated plaintiff's fall (May 2, 
1991); Don Harsh, chief maintenance officer who witnessed 
plaintiff's fall and assisted her after; Rick Mills, chief 
grounds officer; Al Landvatter, risk manager for Sinclair Oil; 
Greg Hagelberg, a security officer who investigated a similar 
incident after plaintiff's (December 22, 1991); Shawn Powis, 
another security officer who investigated a similar incident 
after plaintiff's (June 29, 1991); and Lee Arrington, the 
security officer who investigated Sandra Walraven's incident 
(April 25, 1991). 
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there were never any discussions about there being a problem 
with water on the asphalt.6 
18. When this accident was investigated (the day it 
happened), no particular slipperiness was found on the asphalt. 
(R.1189, LL.7-15) 
19. It was determined that the Little America 
asphalt, in the area where plaintiff fell, was "quite an 
abrasive compound..., more rocks than some asphalt does [sic], 
which makes it less slippery...." (R.1213, LL.6-18) 
20. The gilsonite-based product chosen by Little 
America had been recommended by a professional asphalt paving 
company before the incident in question. (R.241) 
21. Little America was careful in its application, 
first reading the directions (R.906, LL.8, 15); preparing the 
surface by cleaning with brooms and a power sweep (R.899, 
LL.14-15); applying one coat and spreading it out as far as it 
would go (R.903, LL.21-22; R.907, L.21); and seeing that no 
puddles formed. (R.908, LL.3-10) 
22. Rick Mills, the grounds supervisor, had done the 
job once before. Two or three members of his crew had done it 
in the years before that. (R.864, LL.8-23) 
6Since these references are lengthy, they are reproduced 
in the Addendum. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
1. Plaintiff has failed to show the existence of a 
dangerous condition on the Little America premises at the time 
she fell. There is no competent proof that the sealant was 
making the asphalt slippery more than eight months after its 
application. 
2. "Notice" is still an element of premises 
liability, even when the landowner "creates" the condition that 
causes the injury. The "variant" theory of premises liability 
assumes that hazardousness of the condition is apparent to the 
landowner when the condition is created. 
3. The facts are undisputed that defendant neither 
knew nor had reason to know there was a dangerous condition on 
the Little America premises. In all of the years that 
defendant has been treating the asphalt at Little America with 
sealant, there has been only one incident of someone slipping 
on the asphalt in the rain. That was Sandra Walraven, and 
there was nothing about that incident to put defendant on 
notice of a hazardous condition at Little America. 
4. It is not error to grant summary judgment in 
negligence cases. Cases of "simple" negligence (breach of the 
required standard of care under the circumstances) usually make 
for jury cases. However, premises cases have a dual nature. 
Landowners can defend on the basis of due care and also on the 
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basis of lack of notice. Issues of due care may make for jury 
cases, but notice issues undeniably make for summary judgment. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED IN HER 





OF A DANGEROUS 
LITTLE AMERICA 
PREMISES. 
Plaintiff slipped and fell while walking in the rain 
at Little America. Plaintiff complained that the asphalt she 
was walking on was unreasonably slippery. Originally, 
plaintiff contended that she slipped on oil or automotive 
grease in the parking lot. Plaintiff recognized that such a 
theory would have required her to show that Little America had 
"notice" of the dangerous or defective condition. Martin v. 
Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d 1139, 1140 (Utah 1977). When we 
informed her that eight months prior to the accident the 
asphalt had been treated with a sealant, she changed her theory 
and said there was no oil or grease; it was the sealant that 
made the asphalt unreasonably slippery. 
She got a gentleman named Charles Turnbow to sign an 
affidavit to that effect. Mr. Turnbow is an attorney and 
professional engineer who has been qualified "hundreds of 
times" to give testimony in slip and fall cases. Though his 
resume boasts a background in chemistry, his affidavit fails to 
state his experience with asphalt sealant. Mr. Turnbow did not 
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visit Little America or conduct any tests of its asphalt or the 
sealant that was used. All he reviewed were the pleadings and 
depositions in this case. Based on this, Mr. Turnbow rendered 
the following opinion in paragraph 7: "For a period of time 
following the application of asphalt sealant..., the surface to 
which the sealant is applied will be 'slippery when wet.'" 
An expert's affidavit is deficient if it fails to set 
forth "the specific facts that logically support the expert's 
conclusion." Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah 
1992). Mr. Turnbow fails to state any facts in support of his 
conclusion. There is not even the "bare assertion" that he has 
reviewed the facts and based his opinion on them, which, of 
course, is totally deficient. Icl. (citing with disapproval 
American Concept Insurance Co. v. Lochhead, 751 P.2d 271, 274 
(Utah App. 1988)). We have no way of knowing what it is about 
the sealant that was making the asphalt slippery. An affidavit 
that is deficient in this manner will not raise genuine issues 
of material fact to defeat a summary judgment motion. 
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d at 102. 
Mr. Turnbow's opinion is also patently irrelevant. 
Everyone knows that asphalt is slippery when wet. The burden 
is on plaintiff to show that the slipperiness was "extra-
ordinary." De Weese v. J.C. Penney Company, 297 P.2d 898, 902 
(Utah 1956). There is nothing in Mr. Turnbow's affidavit to 
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indicate the degree to which the sealant supposedly made the 
asphalt slippery. We should not have to presume that the 
sealant made the asphalt unreasonably slippery when it rained. 
The problems with Mr. Turnbow's affidavit do not stop 
there. Even if his preliminary conclusion were correct--that 
the asphalt was slippery when wet because of the sealant--he 
would have to show that the sealant continued making the 
asphalt slippery to the day of plaintiff's accident, more than 
eight months after its application. Mr. Turnbow's affidavit 
fails to address this critical point. All he says in paragraph 
9 is that Little America did nothing to "eliminate" or 
"substantially ameliorate" the slippery when wet condition 
supposedly created by the asphalt sealant. That is not the 
same as saying that the "slippery when wet" condition persisted 
to the day of plaintiff's accident. 
Mr. Turnbow goes on in paragraph 10 to say that he is 
"familiar with the standard of care... for owners/operators of 
facilities such as the Salt Lake City Little America (including 
the parking and driving areas)" and that Little America 
breached that standard of care by failing to "steam-clean" its 
asphalt. Whatever the merits of this suggestion, he once again 
fails to state "specific facts that logically support [his] 
conclusion." His conclusion is that other Salt Lake City 
property owners steam-clean their asphalt. He has failed to 
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cite a single example. He has failed to state what kind of 
investigation he performed to verify this conclusion. We note 
that Mr. Turnbow hails from Apple Valley, California. Nowhere 
does he state that he visited Utah. It would seem that a visit 
to our city would be in order before rendering this kind of 
conclusion. 
In paragraph 12, Mr. Turnbow offers one final, 
unsubstantiated conclusion that "the subject incident was a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the failures specified in 
the immediately preceding paragraph." Why is that so? He does 
not say. The Supreme Court has ruled that an "affidavit which 
merely reflects the affiant's unsubstantiated conclusions and 
which fails to state evidentiary facts is insufficient to 
create an issue of fact." Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d 723, 725 
(Utah 1985). That is precisely the problem with Mr. Turnbow's 
affidavit and the reason why the trial court concluded Mr. 
Turnbow's affidavit "adds nothing" to the question of 
defendant's knowledge of a dangerous condition. 
For obvious reasons, plaintiff was reluctant to put 
all of her eggs in Mr. Turnbow's basket. Even if she cannot 
state why, she wants the Court to know that the asphalt at 
Little America was more slippery than any asphalt she has ever 
encountered. The problem for plaintiff is that such proof is 
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inadequate as a matter of law to meet a summary judgment 
motion. 
In Gaddis v. Ladies Literary Club, 288 P.2d 785 (Utah 
1955), plaintiff complained that she slipped and fell on a 
wooden stage that had been recently waxed. She thought her 
testimony about the slipperiness of the floor, coupled with 
evidence of the waxing, would be sufficient to send the case to 
the jury. The Supreme Court did not agree: 
On appeal, plaintiff contends that 
the mere proof that a floor is slippery 
creates a jury question as to whether any 
application of wax to a floor is 
negligent.... 
The majority of courts in the United 
States hold that the mere application of 
wax to a floor will not constitute 
negligence, even though having some 
tendency to make the floor more slippery. 
To hold otherwise, these courts reason, is 
to permit the jury to act upon speculation 
and conjecture upon the plaintiff's 
testimony that [s]he slipped on a floor 
which [s]he deemed to have been made 
excessively slippery by defendant's 
application of wax. 
288 P.2d at 786 (citations omitted). 
Accordingly, the Supreme Court affirmed the trial 
court's directed verdict. 
If plaintiff's testimony is "speculative" and 
"conjectural," so is the testimony of her friend, Bruce Parker, 
who slipped in the rain a week before and complained about 
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"excessive" slipperiness. The reason for this is expressed by 
the Court in Gaddis: " [S]lipperiness is a relative term 
and...the fact that a floor is slippery does not necessarily 
mean that it is dangerous to walk on." 288 P.2d at 786. What 
is slippery for one may not be slippery for another. 
Slipperiness alone does not connote dangerousness. 
It goes without saying that there are hazards 
commonly associated with living in a three-dimensional, 
physical world. One of them is precipitation: "Owners of 
stores, banks, office buildings, theaters or other buildings 
where the public is invited to come on business or for pleasure 
are not insurers against all forms of accidents that may happen 
to any who come. It is not the duty of persons in control of 
such buildings to mop the sidewalk dry or take other steps 
necessary to prevent the accumulation of moisture on the 
sidewalk....11 Martin v. Safeway Stores Inc., 565 P.2d at 1141 
(emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court has already concluded (Martin) that 
hazards commonly associated with precipitation are not 
unreasonable. Plaintiff must show that the hazards she 
encountered at Little America were uncommon, in other words, 
extraordinary or unreasonable. She cannot do this through her 
testimony or the testimony of her friends. She must come 
forward with objective, verifiable proof. All she has mustered 
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is the affidavit of the professional witness, Charles Turnbow, 
which is entirely devoid of proof. It is also positively 
irrelevant because it does nothing to establish the critical 
element that the conditions at Little America were unreasonably 
dangerous at the time plaintiff slipped and fell. This Court 
may affirm the ruling of the trial court since there was no 
triable issue as to the dangerousness of the premises at Little 
America. Rule 56(d), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
II. NOTICE IS STILL AN ELEMENT OF 
UTAH LAW, EVEN UNDER THE 
VARIANT TO PREMISES LIABILITY. 
The reason given by the trial court for granting 
summary judgment was no "notice." Plaintiff is under the 
mistaken impression that notice has been excused in Utah law. 
She contends that liability is established simply by showing 
that Little America "created" a condition that turned out to be 
dangerous, even if there were no reason for Little America to 
suspect it was dangerous at the time. We will demonstrate that 
premises liability is not strict liability. Notice is still an 
element of plaintiff's case. 
Plaintiff is relying on the "variant" to premises 
liability first recognized in Long v. Smith Food Kind Store, 
531 P.2d 360 (Utah 1973). In that case, the variant was stated 
as follows: 
[I]n order to impose liability for an 
injury resulting from some foreign 
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substance or defective condition it must 
have existed for such time and manner that 
in due care the defendant either knew or 
should have known, and remedied it; and the 
variant thereof, that if the condition or 
defect was created by defendant himself or 
his agents or employees, the notice 
requirement does not apply. 
531 P.2d at 361 (emphasis added). 
There is no dispute that Little America created the 
condition of which plaintiff complains (asphalt sealant). On 
the surface, it would appear that plaintiff is correct: All 
she need prove is that the property owner created a condition 
that turned out to be dangerous. However, a closer reading of 
the cases is required. 
The two leading cases, for plaintiff at least, are 
Silcox v. Skaggs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d 623 (Utah App. 
1991) and Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d 1224 (Utah 
App. 1992). The defendants in Silcox tried to escape liability 
by arguing there was no evidence they had "created" the 
specific condition that caused injuries. This Court disagreed 
and reversed the trial court decision granting summary 
judgment. Silcox is more important (at least in terms of this 
case) for what it did not address. 
It was taken for granted that the condition arguably 
created by defendants was dangerous. It is difficult to see 
how anyone could disagree. No one would deny that melting ice 
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on a supermarket floor posed a hazard to shoppers. There may 
have been a question as to who created the hazard, but there 
was definitely no question that the condition posed a 
"foreseeable risk of harm." Silcox v. Skaaas Alpha Beta, Inc., 
814 P.2d at 624. 
This point becomes clearer in Canfield. The relevant 
question was stated as whether plaintiff must show "notice of 
the specific lettuce leaf upon she slipped and fell." 841 P. 2d 
at 1226. Defendant tried to escape liability by arguing that 
the "specific lettuce leaf" upon which plaintiff slipped and 
fell was placed there by one of its customers, so that it could 
not be said to have "created" the hazardous condition. 
What is significant is that once again, there was no 
dispute that the specific condition was dangerous. Nor could 
there have been, given the fact that defendant "placed empty 
boxes around the farmer's pack display in which customers could 
place the discarded leaves," 841 P.2d at 1225, proof positive 
defendant recognized there was a hazard. The holding in the 
case was appropriately narrow: 
[T]here is no logical distinction between a 
situation in which the storeowner directly 
creates the condition or defect, and where 
the storeowner's method of operation 
creates a situation where it is reasonably 
foreseeable that the expectable acts of 
third parties will create a dangerous 
condition or defect. 
841 P.2d at 1226 (citation omitted). 
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Most significant is what is stated by the Court 
immediately after: 
We therefore reiterate the rule set 
forth in De Weese fv. J.C. Penney Company, 
297 P.2d 898], that where the storeowner 
chooses a method of operation where it is 
reasonably foreseeable that the expectable 
acts of third parties will create a 
dangerous condition, an injured party need 
not prove either actual or constructive 
knowledge of the specific condition. In 
this type of case, notice is satisfied as a 
matter of law because the storeowner is 
deemed to be informed of the dangerous 
condition since it adopted the method of 
operation. 
841 P.2d at 1226 (emphasis added). 
The Court was thus excusing notice of the "specific" 
condition, but not that of the general condition that allowed 
the specific condition to come into play. Notice of the 
"specific" condition was satisfied as a matter of law since 
defendant undeniably had notice that the general condition (its 
method of operation) posed an unreasonable risk of harm to 
customers, or, as the Court stated: "It was reasonably 
foreseeable that under this method of operation some leaves 
would fall or be dropped on the floor by customers thereby 
creating a dangerous condition." 841 P.2d at 1227 (emphasis 
added). 
This is where plaintiff misses the boat in this case. 
Notice of the "specific" condition (slipperiness of the asphalt 
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on the day in question) may be excused, but there must still be 
notice of the hazardousness of the general condition (asphalt 
sealant producing slippery conditions eight months after its 
application). In other words, plaintiff must show that at some 
time prior to her accident, Little America knew or had reason 
to know that its application of asphalt sealant made the 
asphalt surfaces more slippery than usual. Anything short of 
that would be strict liability. 
This point is made clearer by a line of Washington 
cases recognizing the same "no-notice" variant as Utah. In 
Washington, notice is excused "when the nature of the 
proprietor's business and his methods of operation are such 
that the existence of unsafe conditions on the premises is 
reasonably foreseeable." Pimentel v. Roundup Company, 666 P.2d 
888, 893 (Wash. 1983)(emphasis added). The court was careful 
to stress that this "does not change the general rule governing 
liability for failure to maintain premises in a reasonably safe 
condition: the unsafe condition must either be caused by the 
proprietor or his employees, or the proprietor must have actual 
or constructive notice of the unsafe condition." Id. 
In a case following Pimentel, the Washington Supreme 
Court elaborated further: 
Pimentel reaffirmed that most 
plaintiffs still need to show that a 
proprietor had actual or constructive 
notice of an unsafe condition.... [In 
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Pimentel w]e emphasized that this exception 
did not impose strict liability or even 
shift the burden to the defendant to 
disprove negligence. Rather, where the 
operation of a business is such that 
unreasonably dangerous conditions are 
continuous or reasonably foreseeable, it is 
unnecessary to prove the length of time 
that the dangerous condition had 
existed.... 
Wiltse v. Albertson's Inc., 805 P.2d 793, 798 (Wash. 1991) 
(emphasis added). 
We agree that notice should be excused when a 
landowner creates an obviously dangerous condition, a condition 
that everyone agrees is an accident "waiting to happen." 
However, in the absence of proof that the landowner has created 
an obvious or foreseeable risk of harm, either directly or by 
its method of operation, we urge the Court to adopt the 
following rule: " [T]here is no liability for harm resulting 
from conditions from which no unreasonable risk was to be 
anticipated,...." Prosser and Keeton on Torts, § 61, p. 426 
(5th ed. 1984) . 
We have searched in vain for a Utah case where the 
landowner did not have notice of the dangerousness of the 
condition. Koer v. Mavfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566 (Utah 1967) 
is said to be the source of the variant to premises 
liability.7 The Court said that if plaintiff could show "the 
7Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d at 361. 
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object causing the injury was placed there by the 
[storeowner],...a prima facie case for the jury is established 
on the issue of negligence." 431 P.2d at 569. The reason for 
this was obvious: No one denied "the grape on the floor was a 
dangerous condition." Id. Plaintiff lost because she did not 
"sustain [] her burden of coming forward with enough evidence to 
link the store in any way to the presence of the grape on the 
floor." Id. 
De Weese is a case decided against the landowner, but 
the undisputed facts were that "defendant knew of the 
characteristic of terrazzo to become slippery when wet, and 
that it was its custom,...to use rubber mats or grit to prevent 
slipperiness during stormy weather. 297 P.2d at 901 (emphasis 
added). Notice was satisfied by the fact that defendant had 
previously recognized a hazard even though it did not know of 
the specific hazard on the day in question. 
Campbell v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 388 P.2d 409 (Utah 
1964) is another case decided against the landowner, but it 
represents yet another case where the hazard was obvious. The 
storeowner defended by arguing it had not left the cardboard 
box in the supermarket aisle, and the trial court granted 
judgment notwithstanding the verdict. The Supreme Court 
reversed, and in doing so, made the following comment about the 
dangerousness of the condition: 
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It is hardly open to question that 
reasonable minds could believe that the 
leaving of such a box in the aisle, where 
people are expected to be preoccupied in 
searching the shelves for groceries, would 
create a hazard exposing others to an 
unreasonable risk of harm. That danger to 
customers is reasonably to be apprehended 
from such a circumstance is shown by the 
defendant's store manager,...who testified 
to the care he personally observed and 
urged upon his employees to keep the aisles 
free of boxes and merchandise in the 
interest of safety. 
388 P.2d at 410. 
The law is clear: There is no liability, even under 
the variant theory of premises liability, unless the landowner 
"knew or should have known of the [hazardous] condition." 
Silcox v. Skaqgs Alpha Beta, Inc., 814 P.2d at 624. In such a 
case, notice is satisfied where the dangerous condition or 
defect "was created by the defendant himself or his agents or 
employees." Id. The same holds true in the "method of 
operation" cases where "the storeowner is deemed to be informed 
of the dangerous condition since it adopted the method of 
operation." Canfield v. Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d at 1226. 
Under no circumstances is there liability unless the risk of 
harm is "foreseeable." 814 P.2d at 624; 841 P.2d at 1227. 
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III. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY 
CONCLUDED LITTLE AMERICA HAD NO 
NOTICE OF A DANGEROUS CONDITION 
ON ITS PREMISES. 
Plaintiff has stated nine pages of facts in her 
brief. Plaintiff hopes to avoid the entry of summary judgment 
by "burying" the Court in facts. The problem is that none of 
the facts stated by plaintiff are in dispute. When the facts 
are not in dispute (and only one conclusion can be drawn from 
them) negligence becomes a question of law. Silcox v. Skaaas 
Alpha Beta, Inc.. 814 P.2d at 624. The question is whether the 
trial court correctly concluded that Little America had no 
notice of a dangerous condition on its premises. 
Plaintiff has only mustered two facts in support of 
her claim of notice. It is undisputed that the asphalt sealant 
came with application instructions, part of which said: "On 
smooth pavement, fine silica sand may be broadcast into wet 
coating to increase non-slip characteristics." It is also 
undisputed that one week prior to the plaintiff's incident, 
another Little America guest reported slipping and falling in 
the rain. When taken with the great many facts mustered by 
Little America in support of its summary judgment, this Court 
should conclude, as did the trial court, that the "'dangerous 
condition' of which the plaintiff complains was one of which 
the [defendant] had no knowledge nor any reason to know...." 
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First of all, let us place plaintiff's two facts in 
context. She has not read all of the relevant application 
instructions. We think it important for the Court to note that 
this product was perfectly appropriate for the use made of it 
by Little America. Consider the statement that the product "is 
recommended for driveways, parking lots, tennis courts, school 
playgrounds and other bituminous pavement surfaces." These are 
all places where people are expected to walk when it rains. 
Nothing about that would put the user on notice that the 
product makes surfaces slippery when wet. The provision for 
adding sand does nothing to warn of a dangerous condition. 
What it says is that silica sand "may" be broadcast into the 
wet coating, but note that this is to "increase the non-slip 
characteristics" the product already has. There is absolutely 
nothing on the label warning about a dangerous slippery when 
wet condition. 
Similarly, the Sandra Walraven incident proves too 
much. Ms. Walraven fell one week before plaintiff, but she 
fell in a different location. It is undisputed that it was 
"raining pretty hard" at the time. What she reported to the 
Little America guard was that "it was raining, the pavement was 
slick, and I fell." Similarly, the Little America guard did 
not note a complaint of extreme slipperiness. He reported Ms. 
Walraven saying that she fell "while it was raining." 
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It is a fact that Ms. Walraven ultimately lodged a complaint 
about "wet, very slick pavement," but this was after 
plaintiff's accident. 
As for the facts mustered by Little America, it is 
undisputed that in the more than eight months since Little 
America applied the sealant, there had not been a single, 
reported incident, other than Ms. Walraven's. This is 
significant considering the hundreds of people who cross Little 
America's grounds every day, not to mention the dozens of 
employees who do the same. Add to that the fact that this was 
not the first time Little America had used asphalt sealant. 
The undisputed facts of this record disclose that Little 
America had been treating its asphalt surfaces with sealant for 
many years before the incident with plaintiff. There had been 
no reported incidents like these during that entire period of 
time (at least since 1988). It is easy to see why Little 
America did not identify the Walraven incident as a problem 
with its asphalt sealing operations. It is also easy to see 
why Little America did not identify a hazard with only one 
reported incident of someone slipping and falling in the rain. 
Surely one such incident was to be expected given the amount of 




We are mindful that in making this determination, the 
Court must review all "facts and inferences drawn therefrom in 
the light most favorable to the losing party." Canfield v. 
Albertsons, Inc., 841 P.2d at 1226. We fail to see how that 
would change the result in this case. 
Sandra Walraven fell eight months after Little 
America made its last application of asphalt sealant. Surely, 
given the amount of time that had passed and the absence of 
similar incidents, it would not be reasonable for defendant to 
infer that the asphalt sealant was creating a problem. Nor 
would it be reasonable, given the absence of slip and fall 
incidents in general, for defendant to infer that there was a 
problem with the asphalt in the rain. For that to be the case, 
there would have to be an epidemic of slip and falls, all over 
the grounds, but that was not the case. Hundreds of people 
walk on the Little America premises every day. The fact that 
in eight months with hundreds of thousands of people walking on 
the asphalt there was only one incident of someone slipping and 
falling in the rain, suggests that Ms. Walraven encountered a 
slick spot that was confined to the area where she fell. There 
is nothing about that incident that would indicate a serious 
risk of harm, particularly considering the absence of a 
complaint from her that the surface was "excessively" slippery. 
Ms. Walraven herself, in her undisputed report to Little 
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America, seemed to chalk her accident up to nothing more than 
wet asphalt. 
It is a fact that the application instructions 
indicated sand could be added to "increase non-slip 
characteristics." But is it reasonable to infer that Little 
America knew it was gambling with the safety of its guests when 
it failed to use the sand? What reason was there for Little 
America to use the sand when it had made the same application 
many years running without incident? 
Granting summary judgment is not an unusual precedent 
in slip and fall cases. The Washington Court of Appeals8 
ruled that a similar question ("whether the operating 
procedures of a defendant's store are such that unreasonably 
dangerous conditions are continuous or reasonably foreseeable") 
was a question of law to be decided by the court. Coleman v. 
Ernst Home Center, Inc., 853 P.2d 473, 476 (Wash. App. 
1993)(citation omitted). This would follow from our Supreme 
Court's recent affirmation that duty is a question of law to be 
determined by the court. Hunsaker v. State of Utah, 870 P.2d 
893, 897 (Utah 1993). In all instances, the trial court made 
the right conclusions from the facts admitted and should be 
affirmed. 
8Following the Pimentel line of cases discussed above. 
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IV. IT IS NOT ERROR TO GRANT 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN NEGLIGENCE 
CASES. 
Plaintiff spends a great deal of time in her brief 
trying to convince the Court that summary judgment should never 
be granted in negligence cases. She relies on the principle, 
oft-times stated, that "[s]ummary judgment should be granted 
with great caution in negligence cases." Williams v. Melbv, 699 
P.2d at 725. There is no reason to dispute that, since this is 
not a case of simple negligence. This is a case of premises 
liability, and premises cases require more than a showing of 
simple negligence. They require a showing of "notice," and 
notice is a proper subject of summary judgment even if 
negligence is not. 
The dual nature of premises cases is well illustrated 
by one of the cases cited by plaintiff, Canfield v. Albertsons, 
Inc., 841 P.2d 1224. Plaintiff slipped and fell on a lettuce 
leaf on a supermarket fl oor. Albertsons defended on the basis 
that it had no notice of the lettuce leaf. The Court of 
Appeals reversed because Albertsons had created a situation 
where it was reasonably foreseeable that customers would drop 
lettuce leaves on the floor, thus satisfying the notice 
requirement. The Court said that the "relevant question is 
whether Albertsons took reasonable precautions to protect 
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customers against the dangerous condition it created." 841 P.2d 
at 1227. 
In other words, Albertsons was permitted to defend, 
even though it had notice of the dangerous condition, on the 
basis that it had exercised due care. This then was a question 
of simple negligence. The Court of Appeals said summary 
judgment should not have been granted on the negligence 
question because "the determination of reasonableness, and 
negligence, lies within the province of the jury." Canfield, 
841 P.2d at 1227. However, the Court was quick to add, just as 
we have argued above, that " [q]uestions involving 
reasonableness and negligence 'become questions of law...when 
the facts are undisputed and only one conclusion can be drawn 
from them. ' " Id. (quoting Silcox v. Skacrcrs Alpha Beta, Inc.. 
814 P.2d at 624). 
This case is to be distinguished from the cases cited 
by plaintiff. Schreiter v. Wasatch Manor, Inc., 871 P.2d 570 
(Utah App. 1994) was a "breach of duty" case. Defendant moved 
for summary judgment arguing that it had no duty to install a 
fire sprinkler system. The Court ruled that "reasonable minds 
could differ on whether the standard of care...required more 
than simple compliance with the building code, given the 




Wvcalis v. Guardian Title of Utah, 780 P.2d 821 (Utah 
App. 198 9) involved a claim that defendant "breached its duty 
as trustee under the trust deed in reconveying [plaintiff's] 
interest without her actual authorization." 780 P.2d at 825. 
The Court ruled that summary judgment is inappropriate unless 
the applicable standard of care is "fixed by law" and 
"reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the 
defendant's negligence under the circumstances." Id. (citations 
omitted). 
Donahue v. Durfee, 780 P.2d 1275 (Utah App. 1989) is 
a case where the historical rule of "open and obvious danger" 
was used by defendant as a total bar to liability. The rule 
was abolished as being incompatible with Utah's comparative 
negligence scheme. 780 P.2d at 1279. The case is inapplicable 
because we are not claiming any comparative negligence on 
plaintiff's part. Similarly, we are not claiming that the 
standard of care of a hotel owner for the safety of its patrons 
on asphalt driveways has been "fixed by law" or that 
"reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion as to the 
defendant's negligence under the circumstances." 
Plaintiff cited one "sealant" case from Ohio, Kovach 
v. Repasky, 1991 Lexis 1897 (Ohio App.) Without attempting a 
canvass of Ohio law, it would appear that there is no notice 
requirement, at least none that appears in the case. The facts 
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of that case are also inapplicable. It is possible that it 
rained for the first time on the day plaintiff slipped and 
fell. The sealant in question was applied thirty days before 
the incident. An "oily residue" was apparent on the surface of 
the parking lot. There was such a build-up of sealant that 
plaintiff's shoes and clothes were soiled in the fall. 
Plaintiff had walked on this particular surface many times 
before and had never encountered such slipperiness. On the 
basis of these facts, summary judgment was reversed. In doing 
so, the court noted that questions of "proximate cause" and 
"breach of duty" were particularly fact-sensitive. None of the 
other cases cited by plaintiff involved asphalt sealant. 
If we must look outside the State of Utah for 
relevant authority, there are two cases we would recommend. 
Cohn v. Florida National Bank at Orlando, 223 So.2d 767 (Fla. 
App. 1969) is a case where plaintiff claimed to have slipped 
and fallen on wet asphalt sealant. The case was tried before 
a jury, and the trial court granted defendant's motion for 
directed verdict. The proof was that the asphalt sealant had 
been applied one year prior to the accident. Plaintiff's 
expert admitted never having run any tests to determine if what 
was on plaintiff's boot was asphalt sealant. The expert 
admitted that he could not determine if the sealant that was 
applied by defendant was slippery. Significantly, the court 
161X47654 1 
- 33 -
noted that "[t]here was no testimony that the defendant had 
actual knowledge of a dangerous condition." 223 So.2d at 768. 
On the basis of the foregoing, the court ruled as follows: 
There is nothing in the above or 
elsewhere in the record to indicate that 
the sealer was applied wrongfully or that 
its being placed upon the lot for the use 
of invitees was a negligent act. There is 
no evidence that the sealer was dangerously 
slippery when wet. The recommendations of 
the expert that sealer not be used or that 
sand be used in the sealer for pedestrian 
walkways, is not evidence that the sealer 
in question was dangerous or that the 
parking lot was not a reasonably safe place 
on which to walk. 
Accordingly, the trial court was affirmed. Id. 
In another case, Chambers v. Arnold, 1989 Lexis 554 
(Tenn. App.), summary judgment for the landowner was affirmed. 
The claim was that plaintiff slipped and fell on an asphalt 
driveway that had been recently sealed. The proof was that it 
had been "several months" since the sealant had been applied. 
Plaintiff was wearing leather-soled shoes and slipped and fell 
as he ran around the corner of his truck. The only proof from 
plaintiff was his testimony (and that of his son) that the 
driveway was "quite slick." The court ruled that this 
"statement standing alone,...does not create 'a genuine issue 
for trial.'" 
We agree that the "reasonableness" of defendant's 
precautions in this case would not make for summary judgment. 
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However, it is clear that "notice" cases, unlike negligence 
cases, do make for summary judgment: Martin v. Safeway Stores 
Inc., 565 P.2d 1139; Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 
P.2d 175 (Utah 1975); Long v. Smith Food King Store, 531 P.2d 
360; Howard v. Auerbach Company, 437 P.2d 895 (Utah 1968); Koer 
v. Mavfair Markets, 431 P.2d 566; Gaddis v. Ladies Literary 
Club, 288 P.2d 785; Lindsay v. Eccles Hotel Corporation, 284 
P.2d 477 (Utah 1955). Three of these were summary judgment 
cases (Allen, Long and Howard), and the others were cases of 
directed verdicts for defendant. However, the standard for 
directed verdicts is the same as that for summary judgment. Nay 
v. General Motors Corporation, GMC Truck Division, 850 P.2d 
1260, 1264 (Utah 1993). 
We agree that a duty of reasonable care is imposed in 
all cases of landowner liability. Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed 
Company, 265 P.2d 1013, 1015 (Utah 1954). But that is not to 
say, as plaintiff suggests, that all "common law distinctions" 
of landowner liability have been abolished. See Donahue v. 
Durfee, supra (noting that common law distinctions have been 
abolished in one case, that of landlord/tenant). 780 P.2d at 
1277 (citing Williams v. Melbv, 699 P.2d at 726). Plaintiff 
herself relies on one such common law distinction, that of the 
"business invitee," which was recently avowed by this Court in 
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Cannon v. University of Utah, 866 P.2d 586, 589 (Utah App. 
1993) . 
A duty of reasonable care under the circumstances has 
not abolished plaintiff's common law burden of proving the 
existence of a "dangerous" condition or "notice" of that 
condition on defendant's part. Else, why would this Court say, 
as it did in Silcox, that it is "well settled in this state 
that...it must be shown that the owner or occupier knew, or by 
the exercise of reasonable care, should have known, of the 
existence of a dangerous condition." 814 P.2d at 624. The Utah 
Supreme Court has never disavowed its ruling in Martin v. 
Safeway Stores Inc.9 that notice is the "essential inquiry 
relating to defendant's negligence...." 565 P.2d at 1140. 
Notice is obviously still a condition of liability under Utah 
law. Plaintiff gets to her negligence question only after 
getting past the notice requirement. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff is wrong when she says "[t]his case 
involves questions of the reasonableness of Little America's 
acts and omissions in connection with the hazardous condition 
that caused Mrs. Weinstein's injuries." (Page 14) Questions of 
"reasonableness" arise only after plaintiff has established (1) 
the "dangerousness" of the condition supposedly causing those 
9Coming years after Glenn v. Gibbons & Reed Company. 
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injuries and (2) "notice" of that condition on defendant's 
part. Plaintiff may have raised genuine issues as to 
reasonableness, but defendant was not moving for summary 
judgment on reasonableness. Plaintiff's case fails because she 
failed to adduce competent evidence that there was a 
"dangerous" condition on the Little America premises or that 
defendant "knew or should have known" of that condition. 
Notice and dangerousness are essential elements of plaintiff's 
case. Summary judgment is appropriate because plaintiff cannot 
prevail on these elements. 
Respectfully submitted, this 23rd day of November, 
1994. 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
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Q. Let's talk about this Walraven incident again 
for a minute. 
Do you recall it ever occurring to you, 
between the time of the Walraven incident and the time 
of the Weinstein incident a week later, that there might 
be a hazard of some kind out there associated with the 
asphalt surface, especially associated when rain water 
was sitting on top of it? 
MR. DALTON: What point in time? 
Q. (By Mr. Collins) In the interim between the 
Walraven and Weinstein incident. 
A. No, sir. 
Q. As you sit here today, has it ever occurred 
to you that there might be a hazard, or in the past, has 


























been a hazard associated with the surface of the asphalt 
parking area and rain water sitting on top of it? Has 
that ever occurred to you that there might be something 
hazardous about that? 
A. Wet pavement? 
Q. Wet — yeah. We'll get to that. The wet 
asphalt surface out there at any time? 
A. No, sir. 
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Q. Do you agree with the proposition that, 
just from your experience around here or maybe your 
experience in life generally, that asphalt gets 
slippery when it's wet? Do you agree with that 
propos it ion? 
A. Correct. So does concrete. So does all 
kinds of surfaces. 
Q. I imagine you have walked on a lot of wet 
asphalt in your life other than what you see here; :: 
that right? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. Based on your experience, is there anything 
more or less slippery about the asphalt surface here 
than on other asphalt surfaces that you have walked 
on when it's been wet, when they have been wet? 
A, Not from my experience. 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
(801 ) 521-5222 
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Q. Have you ever participated in any meetings 
or any discussions, even just a one-to-one informal 
discussion, with any of your security worker 
colleagues or anybody else here at Little America 
about how Little America might address at all this 
problem of people slipping and falling and getting 
hurt on the wet asphalt? 
A. No, we haven't. It's so minimal and so 
seldom, it never happened. To my knowledge, it never 
come up. 
Q. Okay. From where you sat or stood in the 
corporation, did you view it as just one of those 
things that happens that you can't do anything 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
( 801 ) 521-5222 
01202 
about? 
MR. DALTON: I'll object to the extent the 
question's vague and ambiguous, but you can answer if 
you understand. 
Q. In fact, yes, why don't you answer that one 
first? 
A. Well, really no, no, for the simple reason 
that you figure four incidences in 15 years, you 
probably during that 15 years have moved 10,000,000 
people back and forth around there. How can you make 
a policy against something like that? It's not 
happening. And the person falling, we can't even 
point -- in my investigation, I can't even point to 
anything that caused it. The person could have 
tripped over her own foot, could have been looking 
the wrong way, stumbled. 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
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Q. ^^^^^^B Let me get back to this case. Have 
you even thought about this subject matter in 
connection with the situation here at Little America 
prior to my asking you about it; that is, the 
advisability of posting the signs? 
A. No, I have n^t. 
Q. It never occurred to you in this particular 
plant to post them, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Okay. What about, has it ever occurred to 
you or are you aware of any discussions at any time 
before or after this accident about changing the 
surface, the asphalt surface, roughing it up to make 
it less slippery or putting in a rough concrete 
sidewalk or sidewalks to make it less hazardous for 
people walking on the wet surface? Has that ever 
occurred to you? 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
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A. No, it has not. 
Q. And you've never heard of any discussions 
about that either? 
A. No, I have not. That would come under 
maintenance and would not come to us. 
Q. That would be somebody else's job to come 
up with something like that? Is that the idea? 
A. No. If it was to be done or discussed, it 
would probably not be discussed with security. It 
would be discussed with the maintenance department. 
Q. Are you as a person who is concerned about 
the overall safety of this place, including the 
safety of patrons, if something occurs to you, are 
you expected to pass it on as a good idea for 
management to consider? 
MR. DALTON: Object to the extent it calls 
for speculation, but you can answer. 
A. It's never been brought up. 
Q. Never occurred to you, correct? 
A. I might pass something on once in a while 
when I see something that I think should be 
corrected, yes. 
Q. This idea of a safer or less slippery 
walkway when it's wet, this hasn't occurred to you 
before, has it? 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. 
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A. No, it has not. 
Q. Are you aware of any reason why that would 
not be a good idea to do something like that here? 
A. Like I said, to me it seems pointless with 
the lack of problem that's there. 
Q. Let me rephrase that. From where you sit, 
the incidents of people slipping and falling and 
getting hurt on the asphalt surfaces here are so rare 
that it wouldn't warrant the work to be done to go 
further towards eliminating the problem? 
MR. DALTON: Well, I'll object to the 
extent it mischaracterizes. I don't want that to be 
an all-inclusive question, but you can go ahead and 
answer. 
A. I don't see the benefit per se from my 
viewpoint. 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. 
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Q. Have you personally ever slipped or fallen 
or lost your balance out there on that asphalt since 
you have been working here? 
A. Yes, I have. 
Q. Approximately how many times? 
A. Maybe two or three times. When I was 
running on ice, I fell. 
Q. Okay. Let's throw out the ice. 
A. Okay. On water, no. 
Q. Has anybody else, any other of the Little 
America employees to your knowledge had that kind of 
experience, where they've either to your knowledge 
actually gone down without getting hurt or almost 
gone down but saved themselves? 
A. Not if they haven't reported it to us, 
won't be aware of it. 
Q. I don't mean just official incident 
reports, I mean just guys shooting the breeze about 
conditions. 
A. Not that I'm aware. 
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Q. To your knowledge, has there ever been any 
talk here in Little America management circles or 
lower than that among any group of people here about 
building sidewalks -- to follow up on your reference 
to sidewalks earlier -- building sidewalks that have 
a concrete surface for people to use, making it 
easier for people to get to their rooms, rather than 
walking across asphalt on rainy days when the asphalt 
surface is wet? Has that ever been mentioned to your 
knowledge? 
A. Not -- hasn't been talked about that I know 
of, no. 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
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Harsh (Examination By Mr. loinns) 
Q. Have you ever seen any pieces of paper, 
memos or anything that say anything like that? 
A . No . 
Q. Let me jubi point something out to you. I 
think it's fair to say that in this case Little 
America has acknowledged, has in a straightforward 
manner come out and said, in a formal paper or two, 
"Yes, we know that the asphalt surface on our parking 
area," including the general area where my client 
fell, "gets slippery when it's wet outside." Okay. 
Do you agree with that proposition? 
A. Yeah. Asphalt seems to ~2t slippery when 
it gets wet, yes. 
Q. All right. Let's talk about your knowledge 
of that. When you say asphalt gets slippery when 
it's wet, this is something you've known for years, 
correct? And I realize that some of my questions may 
sound a little silly to you, but for the record, 
let's --
A. Yeah, I guess that's true. 
Q. All right. And asphalt as a general 
proposition gets slippery when wet, you've known that 
for years, right, not just asphalt here at the Little 
America? 
True 
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Harsh (Examination By Mr. Collins) 
Q. Is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Has it ever occurred to you before or after 
this accident on May 2, 1991 just from your 
familiarity with this particular plan that the 
asphaltic surface here, including the general area 
where it's been reported to you that my client fell, 
is any more slippery or less slippery than other 
asphalt surfaces with which you have been familiar 
with in your lifetime? 
MR. DALTON: Do you understand the 
question? 
THE WITNESS: Well, I think so. 
A. I don't notice any difference. 
Q. Asphalt's asphalt as far as you are 
concerned? 
A. Yes . 
Q. It gets slippery when wet; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Has there ever been any talk to your 
knowledge since you've been working here, either 
before or after this accident involving my client, 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
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Harsh (Examination By Mr. c o m n s j 
about the advisability or lack of advisability of 
posting signs in conspicuous locations informing 
people that, I don't know the exact words that matter 
to me, but informing people of the fact that this 
asphalt in this area where they might be walking gets 
slippery when wet and informing people that they 
should be extra careful of that? Has there ever been 
any talk of that? 
A. Nothing to my knowledge. 
Q. Let me just ask this for the record. I 
think it follows from what you said. There hasn't 
been any talk as far as you know about the relative 
cost or lack of cost from posting a few signs saying 
that for whatever good that might do? 
A. Not to my knowledge, no. 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
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Q. fl^HB Prior to the time that you saw 
Ms. Weinstein in the spot you have located, had you 
heard from any source in Little America or, for that 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
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Harsn (Examination py ni . v,uxixaJ; 
matter, had you seen anything, any accident involving 
people falling on slippery asphalt in the asphalt 
surfaces anywhere in this complex and getting hurt, 
however seriously or nonseriously? 
MR. DALTON: Before hers. 
A. No, I'm not aware of any. 
Q. Had you ever yourself slipped, whether you 
fell or not, either an accident or a near accident, 
where you either had to catch yourself or almost went 
down anywhere on the asphalt surfaces here before 
that happened? 
A. Not on the asphalt surface, no. 
Q. Had you heard of or seen any of your 
co-employees having such an experience here before 
the accident happened? 
A. Not that I recall. 
Q. Never heard anybody just casually say, 
"Man, it's slippery out there today," or anything 
like that? 
A. Not outside. In the wintertime, of course, 
when you have a little snow and ice before we can get 
it off, yes, then. I've done that. 
Q. But not on a, quote/unquote, "slippery when 
wet" asphalt surface? 
A. No, not the asphalt surface. 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. 
( 801 ) 521-5222 
01091 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
SHARON M. WEINSTEIN, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SINCLAIR OIL CORPORATION, 
a Wyoming Corporation, 
d/b/a LITTLE AMERICA, 
Defendants, 
Civil NO. 910906459 PI 
DEPOSITION OF: 
RICHARD MILLS 
Judge Richard H. Moffat 
ORIGINAL 
* * * * * 
BE IT REMEMBERED that on Wednesday, the 28th day of 
April, 1993, the deposition of RICHARD MILLS, produced 
as a witness herein at the instance of the plaintiff 
herein, in the above-entitled action now pending in the 
above-named Court, was taken before Vana L. Crader, a 
Certified Court Reporter and Notary Public in and for 
the State of Utah, commencing at the hour of 10:20 a.m. 
of said day at the Little America Hotel, 500 South Main 
Street, Salt Lake City, State of Utah. 
Rocky Mcurtalr 
Reporting Service, Ire. 
322 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone (801) 531-0256 
Statewide Reporting 
National and Merit Certified Reporters 
Expedited Delivery 
Computerized Transcription 
IBM Compatible Disks 
Litigation Support Software 
Video Depositions 
00829 
14 Q. What about instances where people have fallen 
15 on wet asphalt out there, not ice or snow? Other than 
16 what we7re talking about in this lawsuit or this 
17 incident involving Sharon Weinstein, are you aware of 
18 any instances, either by direct observation or from 
19 reports that have come to you from any sources, are you 
2 0 aware of other instances where people have fallen out 
21 there? 
22 A. I've not seen any. When we first discussed 
2 3 this case, Mr. Landvatter informed me there were a 
2 4 couple of other instances. 
25 Q. Other than what Mr. Landvatter has told you, 


























are you — have reports come to you before or since of 
other people falling out there? 
MR. DALTON: Have you heard of any other 
such instances other than this one, other than what Al 
told you? 
THE WITNESS: Not on wet asphalt, no. 



























Q. The purpose, if I understand, of this 
resurfacing in '90 was to — I can't remember the term 
you used exactly — rejuvenate the asphalt, preserve it? 
A. Right. 
Q. Was there ever any discussion you recall 
having with anybody here, your workers, your crewmen or 
higher management, about any safety considerations with 
respect to the type of resurfacing or resealing 
substance that ought to be put down? 
A. I don't recall ever having — I don't know 
bringing up a problem or an objection or even a 
complaint about anyone having a problem with the asphalt 



























Q. (By Mr. Collins) Did it ever occur to you 
that there might be safer substances in terms of not 
being as slippery when wet than the stuff that you 
actually put down in '90? 
A. I don't recall if it occurred to me at that 
time or not. 
Q. Has it ever since then occurred to you since 
you put it down? 
A. I've never experienced a problem on the 
asphalt surfaces. I'm sure there is minute variations 
between different types of sealers and the amounts of 
traction that is left on the surface. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES, INC. C0911 
17 here. I don't know. Somebody with tennis shoes jogging 
18 through the parking lot, maybe they would find too much 
19 traction and stumble. I don't know. 
20 Q. In any event, in your resurfacing decision, 
21 the selection of the materials that you used in '90, you 
22 didn't take any of that into consideration, did you? 
23 A. I felt like I chose a product that was a good 
24 product. And, you know, I didn't see any reason to — 
2 5 having not had problems with that type of thing — 



























A. — I didn't see any reason to use somethina 
else. 
ROCKY MOUNTAIN REPORTING SERVICES, INC. 00914 
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Lanavatter (hxamination By Mr. Collins) 
Q. H H H T e H m e *-n Y o u r own words why you as 
a person who has some involvement in the safety of 
the plant here have no plans, if I understand your 
testimony correctly, to do something to remedy what 
appears to me to be an ongoing situation or problem 
in this regard. 
A. The reason is, when you consider there were 
four instances in the 11 years that I have been 
monitoring it, that's an awfully, awfully 
infinitesimal percentage, and going on the assumption 
that people were just careless to some degree or 
other regarding -- regardless of whether I was 
sympathetic of their problem or not, I felt that 
somehow they were careless, and therefore felt no 
necessity to take action, because we have 2,300 
people a day at minimum wandering around on the 
premi ses. 
Q. How do you come to that calculation? 
A. Klaus Kelterborn, who has been referred to, 
and I reviewed records, and you can check the 
restaurant records, the meals sold and then the 
number of guests that we have, and we averaged out 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
( 801 ) 521-5222 
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Q. 2,300 reported persons per day doing 
something on the premises here? 
A. Yes. 
Q. That's residents, and what do you call the 
people who pay overnight, guests? 
A. Yes, uh-huh. 
Q. Guests and restaurant patrons together? 
A. Uh-huh. 
Q. And you don't have any idea, do you, 
Mr. Landvatter, as to how many people there might be 
who have slipped and fallen and maybe have gotten 
hurt but who haven't reported it to anybody betauac 
it hadn't been serious enough? 
A. No. 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. 
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1 Q. And you don't have any idea about how many 
2 people have slipped and fallen and haven't gotten 
3 hurt at all and haven't reported it to anybody, do 
4 you? 
5 A. No. 
6 May I interject a thought there? 
7 Q. Sure. That's fine. 
8 A. I have told our people in meetings that 
9 even if an incident doesn't seem to be serious and 
10 will never cause any problem in any way, they are 
11 still to notify me. And the hotel here and other 
12 facilities, not all of them, but this one has been 
13 very good to report even the simplest type of 
14 incidents that never ever develop into anything. 
15 Q. That depends on the vigilance, first of 
16 all, the knowledge of persons that an incident has 
17 occurred, correct? 
18 A. Right. 
19 Q. And then it depends also on the degree of 
20 seriousness with which the person on duty takes that 
21 part of his job duties to report it, correct? Some 
22 people might not bother; is that correct? 
23 A. They might not, I have to agree, but they 
24 have instructions regardless to give me an incident 
25 report. 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. 
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Landvatter (Examination By Mr. Collins) 
There seems to be from your company an 
acceptance of the proposition that asphalt is 
slippery when wet. Do you agree with that 
propos it ion? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay, And you also agree with the 
proposition, do you not, that this company, Little 
America, by and through its agents knew prior to the 
time this accident happened that asphalt gets 
slippery when wet? 
A. Yes . 
Q. Okay. And I gather also from some other 
answers to interrogatories I've seen that I'm in the 
process of following up on right now formally, that 
you take the position, you meaning Little America, in 
this lawsuit take the position that it's a matter of 
common knowledge, quote/unquote, "that asphalt gets 
slippery when wet"; is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Okay. Had you heard from any source -- and 
forgive me if I've asked you this. I don't think I 
have. Excuse me. Let me back off. 
We've talked about these incidents that you 
are aware of of people falling and getting hurt here, 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
(801) 521-5222 
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^Adiumation By Mr. Collins) 
and I think we've established that you likely had 
personal knowledge of the Walraven incident of April 
25th, the week before my client fell and got hurt, 
correct? 
A. Yes, 
Q. And I think we've also established that 
prior to my client's injury, you were unaware of any 
other reports of an injury in a slip and fall 
accident here, correct? 
A. That is correct. 
Q. Okay. Prior to the time that my client got 
hurt here on May 2, 1991, were you aware either from 
your own personal experience or from reports that had 
been made to you by employees here of the fact that 
the asphalt here got slippery when wet and you had to 
be sort of careful not to slip and fall out there? 
A. No. 
Q. Okay. I take it you had on numerous 
occasions in the years that you have been working for 
Little America, I take it that you have had occasion 
to walk somewhere on the asphaltic surface here when 
it was wet; is that correct? 
A. Yes, many times. 
Q. Okay. And what I'm trying to get at, it 
seems like there is a couple of different things 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. 
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Landvatter (Examinanon ay mr. L U I I U I S ) 
going on here. One, well, before this accident ever 
occurred with Sharon Weinstein, because maybe you or 
she or anybody else who knows about her incident is 
going to be extra careful walking out there when it's 
wet, but prior to the time that she got hurt, did you 
walk with what you would characterize as extra care, 
an extra degree of carefulness on the surface out 
here, the asphalt surface? 
A. Here or anywhere when it's wet. 
Q. Okay. And did you make any distinction in 
your walking on wet surface experience, predate May 
2, 1991 walking on wet surface experience, did you 
make any difference between asphalt let's say on the 
one hand and concrete on the other or wood or grass 
or dirt or any other kind of surface? 
MR. DALTON: In terms of their slippery 
propens ity? 
MR. COLLINS: Yes, in terms of their 
slippery when wet qualities. 
MR. DALTON: I guess consequently, can you 
di st ingui sh? 
THE WITNESS: Yeah, I understand, and 
whenever something is wet, I am careful, and I figure 
people have to be, whether it's grass or something 
else, or wood or cement. 
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ndyeiperg (Examination By Mr. Collins) 
Exclusive of anything that Mr. Dalton has told you or 
anything that anybody else has told you in his 
presence, have you heard of any other incidents here 
at Little America where people have fallen on 
slippery when wet asphalt outside? 
MR. DALTON: Just so you're clear, we may 
have discussed other incidents like this when we met, 
but what he wants to know is outside of that meeting, 
have you heard about any of these other kind of 
incidents . 
A. Just when Stoner called me and told me I 
had this appointment to come in because a woman has 
slipped and failed. 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
(801 ) 521-5222 
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Q. ^ ^ H ^ H And I think you've in essence 
answered this, but is it your testimony or is it your 
recollection that you hadn't heard of any other slips 
and falls out there in the parking area before the 
one that you investigated involving Ms. Lauer at any 
time or at any place? 
MR. DALTON: And I think he's excluding 
ice- and snow-related. I think we're talking wet 
asphalt. 
Is that fair to say? 
MR. COLLINS: Right, right. 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. 
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Hagelberg (Examination By Mr. Collins) 
A. None. No wet asphalt type, no. 
Q. (By Mr. Collins) Okay. Did you ever go to 
any meetings or have you ever gone to any meetings 
here dealing with safety concerns either that you've 
initiated or that Mr. Stoner or anybody else has 
initiated where security guys, part-time I guess 
because that's all you are, and full-time guys, get 
together and talk about various safety concerns? 
A. In our staff meeting with John Stoner that 
we have periodically --
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC 
( 801 ) 521-5222 
G1032 
n a g e j - j j e j r g | L A d m i i i d L i u n ay mx . m i i i n a j 
Q. I'm sorry for interrupting. You were going 
to tell me what happened at those meetings. 
A- On a couple of those meetings that I have 
been here throughout the years, he's told us, if we 
see a problem that's a potential hazard or something 
like that, to let the proper people know so it can be 
dealt with before even someone gets hurt or 
something. 
Q. Before someone gets hurt again in the same 
kind of incident? 
A. I didn't say again. So that no one gets 
hurt. 
Q. Did you consider this instance of her 
falling, Ms. Lauer falling in the spot that she did, 
did you consider that to be a safety hazard? 
A. No. 
Q. I take it you haven't brought it up in any 
meeting since then, have you? 
A. No. 
Q. Have you ever heard anybody at any of these 
safety meetings that you have gone to address the 
matter of people slipping and falling on wet asphalt? 
A. No. 
Q. Why is it from your perspective that you --
if it's fair for me to say this, I think it is --
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that you said that you are of the view that this did 
not present a safety hazard, whatever the condition 
was that caused her to fall in that puddle? 
A. You're asking my opinion why I think it's 
not a safety hazard? 
MR. DALTON: Yes. 
Q. Yes. 
A. Well, because it's fairly level ground and 
the puddle was caused by a small indentation, you 
know, with the settling of the asphalt. That 
appeared -- that's what it appeared to me. And, you 
know, if she had something in her arms and couldn't 
see where she was walking, couldn't -- conceivably 
she could have slipped that way, which if she was 
paying attention to what she was doing, then she 
probably wouldn't have slipped, or if she didn't have 
items in her hands. 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. 
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Q. I guess what I'm trying to get at is, from 
what your earlier answer is, I gather that you 
thought something about the particular nature of her 
slip and fall, that is, in a puddle, and when she had 
her arms full of things caused you to think it wasn't 
a hazard; is that correct? 
A. A hazard from the asphalt standpoint? 
Q. Yes, right. 
A. Yeah, it wasn't a hazard from the 
standpoint from the asphalt. 
Q. I'm sorry. I have taken a number of these 
depositions and things are kind of running together a 
little bit, so I want you to sort of be vigilant. I 
don't want you to admit that you said something 
somebody else told me. Just feel free to correct me 
on that. 
Have you, yourself, ever had problems 
slipping on the asphalt here when it's wet? 
A. Yes . 
Q. How many occasions? 
A. I've slipped two or three times when it's 
been icy and snowy out. 
Q. Right. And I mean just when it's been wet 
from rain puddling, rain or melting ice or just 
TEMPEST REPORTING, INC. 
( 801 ) 521-5222 
01035 


























whatever, just when you've got water either in a 
puddle or out of a puddle but not snow or ice, have 
you ever slipped on that kind of a surface here? 
A. Not that I can recall just water. 
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LQUXWU ay Mr. Collins) 
Q. flHHB Prior to the time that this incident 
happened on June 30, 1991, had you been aware of any 
other incidents where people had reported that they 
had slipped and fallen and suffered any injuries, 
however major or minor, on the asphalt parking and 
driving surface here at Little America, any part 
thereof? 
A. No. 
Q. He; abCuL aiLei uhib one Happened? Did you 
ever hear about any such incident? 
A. I don't remember any, no. 
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Q. Had you personally ever had any mishaps, 
slips and falls or near falls walking on the asphalt 
pavement around here outside when the asphalt 
pavement was wet? 
A. No. 
Q. And had you heard of or seen any other 
Little America employees having such mishaps, whether 
they resulted in actual falls or injuries or not? 
A. No, I don't -- I don't -- I can think of 
none 
Q. Did you have what you considered to be a 
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management position while you were here at the time 
this accident happened? 
A. Yes . 
Q. The one of Mr. Grabb's wife? 
A. Yes . 
Q. Let me put it this way: Had you prior to 
that date at any time heard of or initiated any 
discussions geared toward making the situation more 
safe for patrons of Little America with respect to 
walking on the asphalt surface when it was rainy and 
the surface was wet? 
A. No, I didn't participate in any such 
discuss ions. 
Q. Did you have any reason to think based on*-
anything you had heard or seen that there was 
anything hazardous about the asphalt surface here at 
Little America when it was wet? 
A. No. 
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I did think of one other area I need to ask 
you about, Shaun. Excuse me. 
Based on your own experience, I think 
you've told me that you never had any near slip and 
fall kind of mishaps here on this asphalt when it was 
wet, did you? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. Have you ever had that kind of experience 
on any asphalt when it's wet anyplace? 
A . No . 
Q. Do you know one way or another whether 
asphalt is typically or always, quote/unquote, 
"slippery when wet"? 
A. No, I don't know. I --
MR. COLLINS: That's okay. 
That's all the questions I have. 
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Q. Forgive me if I've asked this, but have you 
investigated any other slip and fall outside? I 
think I've asked you this question. 
A. No, I haven't. 
Q. I'm interested really in what the situation 
was a couple of years ago more than I am now, you 
know, about when this accident happened, but if 
things happened pretty much the same way now as they 
did then, which is the impression I'm getting from 
talking to you and other witnesses, maybe it makes 
more sense to talk to you in the present tense. 
Do you have meetings with you and the other 
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1 security guys about incidents that happen and what 
2 you could perhaps do to make things safer? Does that 
3 ever happen? 
4 A. Oh, we have meetings probably once every 
5 second month. 
6 Q. How do these come up? is it something that 
7 happens? Do you ever suggest that you get together? 
8 Who decides and what causes those things to come 
9 together? 
10 A. Well, every so often they have a meeting 
11 maybe, Stoner usually does, usually when we have a 
12 lot of break-ins in certain areas, we have to check 
13 sooner, a little more often, and when they are really 
14 hitting us for thefts, we have a meeting about that. 
15 Q. Do you recall ever having a meeting about, 
16 you know, people slipping and falling outside? 
17 A. We haven't. 
18 Q. Do you agree with the proposition that 
19 asphalt gets slippery when it's wet? 
20 A. I have never seen it slippery. I been 
21 walking this for four years now. The only time I 
22 seen it slippery is snow and ice. 
23 Q. So you never yourself had an experience 
24 walking around on the asphalt surface out there where 
25 you thought it was slippery, correct? 
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A. Correct, except in the wintertime. 
Q. Right. And I mean when it's wet, not icy. 
A. Okay. 
Q. Has it ever been reported to you by any of 
your -- and I mean official reporting. Have any of 
your fellow security guys or any other employee here 
ever remarked within your earshot that it was 
slippery out there when it was wet? 
A. No . 
Q. What about just in your experience as a guy 
who has been around for quite a few years? Has it 
ever occurred to you just walking around asphalt 
surfaces that they get slippery when wet? 
A. I'm always careful when it is raining, but 
I haven't noticed it being slippery. 
Q. I guess you have no reason to think that 
there is anything more or less slippery about the 
asphalt surface out here than asphalt surfaces at 
large, do you? 
A. No . 
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